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GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Meaning
The Louisiana Civil Code explains that subrogation is the substitution
of one person to the rights of another.1 In the framework of performance
of obligations, the normal effect of performance is to extinguish the
obligation, but that result normally takes place only when performance
is rendered by the obligor himself. 2 If performance is rendered by a
person other than the original or ultimate obligor, such as a third person
who is a stranger to the obligation, or if performance is rendered in
full by one who only owes a part, such as a co-obligor, the obligee
may no longer demand that the obligor perform. That amounts to saying
that one who receives performance from someone other than his obligor
is no longer the obligee of that obligor, although the latter may not
be thereby liberated.' Indeed, whenever the third person who performs
has a recourse against the obligor who owed that performance, that
obligor merely undergoes a change of obligee, as he is now bound to
reimburse the one who performed in his stead. Only in the rare case
where the third person rendered performance out of a spirit of liberality
and for the sole purpose either of helping an obligor who lacked the
means to perform, or of making to him a gift-a donation-of the
amount or value of the performance, would the obligor be entirely free
from his obligation either to the obligee or to the third person.
The rendering of a performance for the account of another gives
to the person who renders it a special action arising either from mandate
or from the management of the affairs of another-gestion d'affaires-
depending on whether the third person rendered the performance at the
obligor's request or on his own initiative, perhaps for the purpose of
sheltering the obligor from action threatened by the obligee.4
The case may also be that without rendering performance to the
obligee directly the third person makes available to the obligor the means
necessary to render performance, which amounts to a contract of loan
between the third person and the obligor, out of which an action for
reimbursement arises for the person who rendered performance., Nev-
ertheless, whether arising from mandate, gestion d'affaires, or loan, the
action against the obligor is personal to the third person who has
1. La. Civ. Code art. 1825.,
2. See La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
3. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Francais 625 (2d
ed. 1954); A. Weill et F. Terr6, Droit Civil-Les obligations 1071 (3d ed. 1980).
4. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2295, 2299, 2985.
5. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2910, 2920, 2921.
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performed, in the sense that it arises directly in his patrimony. More
often than not, the credit for which that action may be brought neither
enjoys a privilege nor is assured by a particular security, which clearly
means that the third person's recourse against the obligor is exposed to
the risk of insolvency.6 For that reason, it is evident that the third
person has an interest in acquiring, besides the action of his own, the
action that belongs to the obligee to whom he has rendered performance,
which satisfies that obligee's interest. Such a transfer to a third person
of the right and action of an obligee is effected through subrogation.
Once subrogated to the right of the obligee, the third person. is entitled
to bring against the obligor the same action that existed against the
obligor since the inception of the obligation and to avail himself of all
the features of that action, such as its executory nature. 7 Through that
action thethird person may enforce the right correlative of the obligor's
duty with all the features that accompany that right, as when the obligor
owes interest in addition to the principal amount. The third person is
also entitled to ensure that enforcement by availing himself of the
securities accessory to the right of the original obligee, such as a mort-
gage, a pledge, or an action in dissolution.'
Usefulness
Thus, subrogation gives an advantage to the third person, by assuring
him of reimbursement in a way considerably more effective than the
personal action that arises from just his act of performing. When the
third person is an investor, as when he chooses to substitute himself
for the obligee because he finds the obligation potentially profitable,
subrogation allows him to invest his resources in a secure manner.9 The
obligee'also benefits from subrogation, since in the vast majority of
instances it is because of the knowledge that he can substitute himself
to the rights of the obligee that a third person may decide to render
performance at a moment when the obligor may lack the means to do
so, thereby fulfilling the expectations of the obligee, who might be
otherwise disappointed.
Subrogation allows'an advantage also to an obligor who lacks the
means or is otherwise unable to render the performance he owes at the
time that is due. As a result of the change of the obligee that *subrogation
facilitates, the obligor may avoid the danger of imminent action against
6. In French law such a credit is called chirographaire.'In La. Civ. Code art. 3397(3),
the word "chirographic" is used to designate a credit arising of a, merely personal or
unsecured obligation.
7. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 626.
8. Id. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
9. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, sipra note 3, at 626.
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him and even obtain an extension of time within which he can perform.10
Effects, Nature, Fiction, Transfer
The basic mechanism that has just been discussed to explain the
meaning of subrogation is summarized in an article of the Louisiana
Civil Code which states that when subrogation results from a person's
performance of the obligation of another, that obligation subsists in
favor of the person who performed it,. who may avail himself of the
action and security of the original obligee against the obligor, but is
extinguished for the original obligee." '
The contradiction between extinction of the obligation and its sur-
vival has given rise to a question concerning the nature of subrogation.
Answering that question, traditional doctrine asserts that subrogation is
a fiction admitted or established by law in certain cases exclusively, by
virtue of which an obligation which is extinguished with regard to the
original creditor by payment he has received from a third person foreign
to the debt, or.from the debtor himself but made with funds a third
person furnished, is regarded as subsisting in favor of the third person,
who is entitled to exercise the rights and actions of the original creditor.' 2
Modern doctrine, however, rejects the idea of a legal fiction and
asserts that it is unnecessary to resort to such an artificial notion to
explain solutions. actually based on practical needs.' 3 It -is more realistic,
it is said, to regard the nature of subrogation as resulting from an
examination of its effects..Then it becomes clear that subrogation is a
mode of effecting a transfer of the active side of an obligation.'4 That
view explains that through subrogation the obligation subsists for the
original obligor, but is extinguished for the original obligee. Following
that approach, the Louisiana Civil Code regulates subrogation in a
chapter devoted to the transfer of obligations, displacing that regulation
from its earlier location, where it was treated as a special effect of an
act of payment. 5 The new location is a better reflection of reality, since
the substitution of a person to the rights of another, which by definition
is effected through subrogation, may result not only from an act of
performance, or payment, but also from other juridical acts such as a
contract of sale.' 6
10. Id. See also A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note 3, at 1072-73.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
12. See I C. Aubry et C. Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais-,obligations 187-188
(La. St. L. Inst. trans. 6th ed. 1965). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (a).
13. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 652-53.
14. Id. at 644-46.
15. See Louisiana Civ. Code Book III, Title Ill, Chapter 4, Section 2. Cf. La. Civ.
Code arts. 2159-2162 (1870).
16. See La. Civ. Code art. 2503. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (c).
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Original Obligee Paid Only in Part
A third person may render only a part of the performance owed
by an obligor. When such is the case, the original obligee who has been
paid only in part may exercise his right for the balance of the debt in
preference to the new obligee.' 7 In other words, the original obligee
retains the right to the balance still owed by the obligor, and that right
takes precedence over the third person's right to recover from the obligor
the portion the third person paid.'
It might be thought, at first blush, that the original obligee's right
to the balance still owed to him and the third person's right to recover
from the obligor are of the same rank, if not fractions of the same
right, since both are correlative of the same duty to perform of the
original obligor. It may seem that in case of insolvency of the obligor
or insufficiency of the security, both the original obligee and the third
person should be on equal footing in their endeavor to recover from
whatever resources may be found in the obligor's patrimony. The law,
however, clearly provides a different solution. Predicated on an inter-
pretation of the obligee's intent, the law gives preference to the original
obligee. According to a traditional adage, no one should be presumed
to act against his own interest when subrogating another to his rights-
nemo contra se subrogasse censetur. 19 An early French authority, whose
work greatly influenced the Code Napoleon, stated that-a creditor who
is paid with resources of a person other than his debtor is bound to
subrogate that person to his right only to the extent that such subrogation
does not impair the creditor's interest. As a consequence, a creditor
who subrogates to his right a third person from whom he received a
partial performance should be presumed to have reserved for himself a
preference for the balance still owed to him.20
The Louisiana jurisprudence has frequently recognized that prefer-
ence. Thus, for the balance owed to him, an obligee has against the
principal obligor a right preferential to the one of a surety who paid
only part of the debt he secured. 2' Likewise, for the balance still owed
to him, the victim of an accident has against the party at fault a right
preferential to an uninsured motorist insurance carrier which subrogated
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
18. See La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (e).
19. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 647-48.
20. R. Pothier, Oeuvres de Pothier-Trait6 de l'hypotheque 464-465 (Bugnet's ed.
1861).
21. St. James Bank and Trust Co. v. S & H Enterprises, Inc., 532 So. 2d 915 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1988). See also Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406
So. 2d 178 (La. 1981); Weber v. Press of H.N. Cornay, Inc., 144 So. 2d 581 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
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itself to the rights of the victim at the time of making partial payment
of the damages that the victim sustained. 2
Since the law that establishes the preference is not one for the
preservation of the public order, private parties may depart from the
provision in their agreement.2 3 Thus, a third person who renders partial
performance to the original obligee may obtain that obligee's consent
to share the rank of his right to the balance with the third person's
right to recover from the obligor the part performance he rendered, or
may even obtain the original obligee's agreement to make his right to
the balance still owed subordinate in rank to the right of the third
person. 24 For that purpose, the bargaining position of the third person
is stronger when he acts spontaneously in tendering partial performance
to the obligee than when he is, for example, a buyer of property subject
to a mortgage who uses the purchase money to make partial payment
of the debt owed to the mortgagee, or a surety who makes partial
payment to the original obligee. 21
Be that as it may, as a peculiar effect of subrogation, the original
obligee's preference in case of partial performance by a third person
cannot take place when partial performance is not possible, as in the
case of an indivisible obligation or a cause of action that may not be
divided. 26
Historical Perspective
Subrogation, as a means of effecting a transfer of an obligation at
the time the obligee receives payment from a person other than his
principal or original obligor, can be traced back to two Roman law
institutions. The first was the cession or assignment of actions, whereby
whenever a creditor demanded payment from an accessory obligor, such
as a surety, the latter by way of defense could demand an assignment
in his favor of the creditor's actions against the principal debtor as a
condition for payment by the surety. The defense of assignment of
actions was later extended to a solidary obligor from whom the creditor
demanded full performance, as well as to a third person in possession
22. See Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1984); Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178 (La. 1981).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 7.
24. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 648.
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 1829. See also 1168 infra.
26. See Richard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975),
aff'd, 326 So. 2d 370 (La. 1976); McConnell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 222 F. Supp. 979
(E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965). See also La. Code Civ. P. art.
425. Also La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (e).
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of mortgage-burdened property on which the mortgage was. about to
foreclose.2
7
The second Roman law institition was the successio in locum cre-
ditoris-the substitution or succession of another person in the creditor's
place-which allowed a third perison to succeed to the rank of a mort-
gagee to whom he had made payment on the secured debt.2 That
advantage could be claimed by a mortgagee who had paid another
mortgagee of superior rank, by a person who had loaned the funds
necessary to make payment to the mortgagee, or by a purchaser of
property burdened with a mortgage who used the purchase money to
make payment to the mortgagee.2 9 Unlike the cession or assignment of
actions, which gave to the third person all the advantages the creditor
had, the successio in locum creditoris allowed the third person only the
benefit of a particular mortgage rank.
A blending of those two Roman institutions took place under the
French ancien droit, in that the cessio in locum creditoris was in a way
absorbed by the cession or assignment of actions.30 In 1609, an edict
of Henry IV sanctioned the binding force of conventional subrogation
effected by the obligor, and in the course of the eighteenth century
recognition was given also to the binding force of conventional sub-
rogation effected by the obligee.3'
At Common Law
At common law, subrogation is not a matter of strict law, but a
purely equitable doctrine, so that granting a remedy based thereon lies
within the discretion of the court. 32
In an early English case where a surety had paid a bond signed by
himself and the principal debtor, the Chancery Court held that the surety
was entitled to a suit in equity to compel assignment of the bond to
himself." Viewing subrogation as a remedy granted in equity rather than
law began in that way.
American states have preserved that approach. In another case, where
a person other than the debtor had paid to a state a debt secured by
27. See W. Buckland, A text-book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 449
and 565 (2d ed. 1950).
28. Id. at 479.
29. See La. Civ. Code art. 1829. See also 1168 infra.
30. See R. Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts 359-367 (Evans
transl. 1806).
31. A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note 3, at 1074.
32. 10 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 843 et seq. (3d ed. 1967);
4 A. Corbin, A Comprehensive Treatise on Rules of Contract Law 63, 125 et.seq., 717
et seq. (1951).
33. Morgan v. Seymour, I Reports in Chancery 120 (1640), cited in I G. Brandt,
The Law of Suretyship and Guaranty 643 (3d ed. 1905).
1150 [Vol. 50
SUBROGA TION
a mortgage on property of a railroad company on which the state was
about to foreclose, the court allowed that person. to subrogate himself
to the rights of the creditor-state against the railroad .company. The
court asserted, however, that subrogation does not originate in contract
but in equity, and that it is to be recognized only in the interest of
substantial justice.3 4
On the other hand, in a case where a surety for a railroad company,
who had paid a creditor a debt for land the railroad company had
appropriated, attempted to enjoin.the use of the company's rails by the
trustee in bankruptcy of the company, the court denied the injunction,
asserting that, because of its equitable nature, subrogation could not
benefit the surety in such circumstances." Likewise, where priority status
was claimed by a creditor who had been forced to. pay a tax debt for
his debtor, the court held there was no priority since there had been
no assignment, and that because of the equitable nature of subrogation
the court did not feel inclined to grant that remedy to the creditor.16
In sum, as clearly expressed by an American court recently, it is
precisely because of its equitable nature that there is no generally accepted
test for the application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation, and,
therefore the use of it in the common-law states depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case."
Real Subrogation
There is also "real" subrogation. As may be expected, "real" sub-
rogation, as opposed to personal subrogation, or subrogation pure and
simple, is the substitution of a thing for another in a universality of
assets and liabilities. 8 When a person has a single patrimony, anything
acquired in exchange or as a counter-performance for the alienation of
an-element of that patrimony enters into the mass by operation of law.
Traditional civilian doctrine regarded real subrogation as a legal fiction.
Modern French doctrine, however, has departed from the idea of fic-
titious substitution of assets and merely maintains that a newly-acquired
asset serves the same purpose as the asset it has replaced. Consequently,
real subrogation takes place when the destination of a thing or of a
34. Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 7 S. Ct. 482 (1887).
35. In the matter of Abram S. Hewitt, 10 N.J. Eq. 210 (C.E. Green N.J. 1874).
36. In re Ted True, Inc., 94 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. N.D. Tx. 1988).
37. Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So. 2d 909 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1989). See
also Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 559 A.2d 365 (Md. 1989). See
also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988) for the conclusion
that an insurer is not entitled to equitable subrogation until the insured has been fully
compensated.
38. See 2 A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise-Property 338 (2d ed 1980).
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mass of things intended for a special purpose is to be preserved, or
when there is a need to secure the restitution of a thing.3 9
Neither the Code Napoleon nor the Louisiana Civil Code address
real. subrogation as a general principle, but both codes contain provisions
that assume the existence of the principle and regulate its specific ap-
plication to certain situations.40 Thus, in Louisiana real subrogation takes
place by operation of law in certain areas such as usufruct and, primarily,
matrimonial regimes where the principle is used to determine whether
property acquired by a spouse during the existence of a community
property regime enters into the community or remains the separate
property of that spouse. 41 In its section devoted to subrogation per se,
however, the Louisiana Civil Code deals only with personal subrogation,
that is, the substitution of a person to the rights of another, and not
with real subrogation, which is the substitution of a thing for another.
Conventional or Legal Subrogation
Subrogation may be conventional or legal.4 2 It may result either
from the agreement of the obligor or the obligee or both with a third
person, or directly from the operation of law for the protection of
persons who perform certain acts.
CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION BY THE OBLIGEE
Obligee and Third Person
An obligee who receives performance from a third person may
subrogate that person to his, the obligee's, rights even without the
obligor's consent.4 3 As a result, the third person, or conventional sub-
rogee, is substituted to all the rights of the original obligee." Indeed,
the third person, or subrogee, is now entitled to recover from the obligor
the full amount of the debt the original obligor was bound to pay to
his initial creditor regardless of the amount he actually paid to the
obligee. 45
39. See 9 C. Aubry et C. Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais 340-346 (5th ed. 1917).
Cf. 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, Trait6 de Droit Civil Francais 32 (2d ed. 1952); H.
Capitant, Essai sur la subrogation reelle, 18 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 385 (1919).
See also 2 A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 38, at 341-46.
40. See 2 A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 38, at 341-46.
41. See La. Civ. Code arts. 614, 615, 616, 2341; Newson v. Adams, 3 La. 231, 233
(1832); 1 Yiannopoulos, Property 343 (2d ed. 1980).
42. La. Civ. Code art. 1825.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 1827.
44. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (d).
45. Id. See also 1180 infra.
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When timeliness of performance is essential, the obligee, by sub-
rogating a third person to his rights, may obtain the advantage of
receiving a timely performance when the original obligor may have
difficulty or may have delayed rendering that performance.4 Unless the
obligation is strictly personal on his part, the obligor suffers no damage
from the substitution of the new obligee, since he is not placed in a
worse position than he was when he initially obligated himself. For that
reason the obligor's consent is not required for subrogation to be validly
effected by the obligee. Since an obligor should not be exposed to claims
by multiple persons as a result of an act of the obligee, however, a
question whether an obligor's consent is required may arise when the
obligation is divisible and the obligee receives only partial performance
from the third person 7.4  All the same, the obligor's consent is not
required even when the obligee only partially subrogates his rights to a
third person from whom he has received less than full performance.
That is so because, in the first place, the pertinent provision of the
Louisiana Civil Code makes no distinction between full and partial
subrogation. 4 In the second place, permitting or preventing a division
of the debt by the obligee is a matter decided on the basis of policies
subject to change in the wake of changing business practices.4 9 In the
third place, where partial performance is concerned, there is no valid
reason to distinguish between conventional and legal subrogation so as
to require the obligor's consent to the former when it is not required
to the latter.50 In sum, no interest of the obligor justifies his having
the right to prevent a conventional subrogation effected by the obligee.
As explained in connection with the general principles that govern sub-
rogation, when the obligee subrogates to his right a third person who
has rendered only partial performance, the third person yields in ranking
to the original obligee should the obligor's assets be insufficient to
afford full recovery to both."
Intention to Subrogate
Although the obligor's consent is not required for an effective sub-
rogation by the obligee, it is quite obvious that the obligee's assent is
essential for the validity of each conventional subrogation. Indeed, al-
though an obligee may not refuse to accept performance tendered to
46. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 627.
47. See Mahaffey v. Benoit, 118 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Stein v.
Williams Lumber Co., 36 So. 2d 62 (La. App. Orl. 1948).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1827.
49. See 1149 supra.
50. See La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (e). See also 1148 supra.
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him by a third person unless the obligation is strictly personal to the
obligor, the obligee cannot be forced to subrogate such a person to his
rights, except when subrogation results directly from the operation of
law.2 Therefore, the obligee's intention to subrogate another person to
his rights must be clearly indicated. Of course, there is no problem
when that intention is expressly stated in the agreement the obligee
concludes with the third person or when the. obligee expressly states he
is subrogating the third person in the receipt he gives to that person
for the performance received. 3
Unlike the Code Napoleon, the Louisiana Civil Code does not require
that subrogation by the obligee be expressA4 Nevertheless, it is not easy
to conceive of a situation where the obligee's intention to transfer his
right to another would not be made express, since that subrogation is
subject. to the rules governing the assignment of rights, which require
that notice of the transfer be given to the obligor in most cases." On
the other hand, the conclusion should be avoided that because it is not
required to be made express, the obligee's intention to subrogate another
to his right can be presumed. Quite the contrary, if disputed, such
intention must be shown by clear proof of acts of the obligee that
unquestionably imply it, as when the obligee has agreed to subrogate
the third person in negotiations that took place prior to the rendering
of performance by that person, or when the obligee has given the obligor
notice that the third person is now the new obligee . 6 It should be
noticed that such acts of the obligee practically amount to making his
intention to subrogate express, although without using the word "sub-
rogation," a use that is not even required in French law."
Need Not be Made in Writing
The Louisiana Civil Code does not prescribe any particular formality
for an act of conventional subrogation by the obligee. Thus, such an
act can be valid even if made orally, subject, of course, to the ability
to overcome the difficulties of proof by the party in interest.5" One line
of Louisiana decisions asserts that a writing is required for a valid
subrogation to be effected by an obligee, although no provision of law
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 1855. See also 1164 infra.
53. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 627-28.
54. Code civil [C. civ.] art. 1250 (Fr. 1804). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2160 (1870);
cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1827.
55. La. Civ. Code arts. 1827, 2642-2643.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 2643.
57. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 627.
58. Id. at 629.
1154 [Vol. 50
SUBROGATION
is cited in support of that conclusion.59 Fortunately, another line of
decisions asserts that an agreement of subrogation by an obligee may
be proved by parol evidence. Thus, where insurance companies have
claimed to have been conventionally subrogated to the rights of their
insureds against the parties through whose fault the insureds had sus-
tained damage without introducing a writing for that purpose, Louisiana
courts have concluded that an insured's testimony concerning his having
received payment from his insurer and that he subrogated the insurer
at that moment to his rights, sufficed to prove a conventional subrogation
by the obligee had taken place. 60 The correct rule is the one stated in
the latter line of decisions.6'
When conventional subrogation by the obligee results from an act
gratuitous in nature, the act amounts to a gratuitous assignment of a
right or the donation of an incorporeal, which requires an authentic act
for its validity, as when a obligee gives to a third person because of
affection or mere liberality the right to collect the debt owed by the
obligor and to keep that amount. 62 Absent such proof, however, the
obligor may refuse to perform in favor of the third person, or alleged
subrogee, since the latter lacks the power to enforce a right he does
not have, unless the obligee confirms the substitution to his rights to
the third person, the donee, in the prescribed form. 63
Finally, a conventional subrogation effected by the obligee is subject
to the general rules that govern the proof of obligations. 64
Before or at the Time of Performance
Performance is one of the ways in which obligations are extin-
guished. 65 Although the pertinent rule states that performance by the
obligor extinguishes the obligation, what that rule means is that the
obligation is extinguished for the obligor when he himself renders per-
formance. As already explained in the general discussion of the general
principles of subrogation, the obligation may not be extinguished for
the obligor when performance is rendered to the obligee by a third
person.66 On the other hand, performance, whatever its source, always
59. See Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., Inc., 298 So. 2d 848 (La. 1974); Succession
of Virgin, 18 La. Ann. 42 (1866); Bank of Bienville v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
172 La. 687, 135 So. 26 (1931).
60. See Brown v. Zito, 333 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Stephens v. Dore,
281 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
61. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (f).
62. La. Civ. Code art. 1536.
63. La. Civ. Code art. 1845.
64. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 629.
65. See La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
66. See 1147 supra.
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extinguishes the obligation for the obligee. That is the case because the
obligee may no longer demand anything from the obligor once his interest
is satisfied, so the legal bond between them comes to an end. Thus,
after receiving performance by either the obligor or a third person, the
obligee no longer has a right to which he may subrogate another.
Therefore, the last time at which the obligee still has a right that he
may transfer is when he is about to receive performance. At the time
the performance is rendered, the obligee may subrogate to his right a
third person from whom he receives it.67 But once he has been paid,
without any mention or discussion of subrogation, the creditor no longer
has a right to which he may subrogate another, even when that other
is the person who paid him. 68
The third person may, however, render performance to the obligee
in several acts or in installments. In that case the obligee may still
subrogate the third person after one or more acts of performance have
taken place, provided that he does so before completion of those acts,
since he has a right that he may transfer only for as long as he has
not received full performance. 69 Likewise, when upon or even after
completion of the performance the obligee must deliver to the third
person an instrument that evidences the obligation or an instrument of
title subrogation may still be effected at the time the obligee delivers
the instrument to the third person.
Although the obligee may no longer subrogate another to his right
after the obligation has been extinguished by performance, he may effect
a subrogation before receiving performance, since for as long as the
obligation is not extinguished he has a right to which he may subrogate
another person. The Louisiana jurisprudence asserts without hesitation
that it is not necessary that subrogation be effected at the same time
as payment and that an agreement granting subrogation to another person
may be entered by an obligee before he receives performance from that
person. Thus, in a case where an obligee and a third person agreed
that the latter would be subrogated to the former's right when he paid
the obligor's debt at a future time, the Louisiana court found that a
valid conventional subrogation took place when the third person sent a
check to the obligee in payment of the debt, several months after the
agreement, without saying anything more about subrogation. 70 The court
made it clear that although subrogation may not be effected after
67. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 628. A. Weill et F. Terr&, supra
note 3, at 1075.
68. See Bank of Bienville v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 172 La. 687, 135
So. 26 (1931); Cooper v. Jennings Refining Co., 118 La. 181, 42 So. 766 (1907).
69. See I C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 12, at 190 and early jurisprudence cited
therein.
70. Cooper v. Jennings Refining Co., 118 La. 181, 42 So. 766 (1907).
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performance has been rendered, it can be validly effected, however,
when the obligee and the third person have agreed before rendering
performance that subrogation will take place in the future. The same
conclusion can be derived from another decision asserting that the time
at which he receives performance from a third person is the latest time
at which an obligee may subrogate that person to his right, which
confirms by implication that subrogation may be validly effected at an
earlier time. 71 Even in modern French doctrine, in spite of language in
the Code Napoleon to the effect that subrogation must be effected at
the time the obligee receives payment, it is not disputed that it may
take place before that time, in which case it is valid as a promise of
subrogation rather than an already perfect subrogation.
7 2
SUBROGATION BY OBLIGEE AND ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
The Louisiana Civil Code
Unlike the Code Napoleon, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that
conventional subrogation by the obligee is subject to the rules governing
the assignment of rights."
Because traditional formulations as stated in the French Civil Code
and earlier Louisiana law merely enumerate situations in which subro-
gation takes prace but do not define all its effects, Louisiana courts
have often regarded subrogation and assignment of rights as equivalent. 74
In one case the court stated that subrogation is in effect a sale. 75 In
another, it was held that the assignment of a judgment made by a bank
to one of several debtors who had paid that judgment, constituted a
legal subrogation of the debt, entitling that co-debtor to exercise the
rights of the bank against the other solidary debtors. 76 In still another
case, a Louisiana court held that a creditor who held a second mortgage
on certain property and bought the notes that were secured by the first
mortgage was legally subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee.
77
At the time they were rendered, the foundation of those practically-
oriented decisions was not strictly correct under then-prevailing law,
which as traditionally formulated gave rise to relevant differences between
subrogation and assignment of rights.
71. See Cox v. W.M. Heroman & Co., Inc., 298 So. 2d 848 (La. 1974).
72. See A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note 3, at 1075.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 1827 and comment (d) thereto.
74. See C. civ. art. 1250 and La. Civ. Code art. 2160 (1870).
75. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 52 So. 2d 311, 314
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
76. See Steele v. Hough, 174 La. 441, 141 So. 22 (1932).
77. See Reine v. Jack, 31 La. Ann. 859 (1875).
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Traditional Differences
In traditional law, subrogation and assignment of rights differ in
at least three ways.
In the first place, although neither an obligee who subrogates another
person to his right nor one who assigns his right to another warrants
the solvency of the obligor, an assignment of rights carries an implied
warranty of the existence of the debt.7 8 No such warranty exists in the
case of subrogation. If the debt does not exist, however, the would-be
subrogee may have an action for unjust enrichment against the alleged
obligee from whom the subrogation was obtained. 79
In the second place, subrogation is effective against third persons,
including the obligor, from the time it takes place, which is expressed
by saying it produces effects erga omnes. An assignment of rights, on
the other hand, requires notice to the debtor or his express acceptance
in order to be effective against third persons. 0
In the third place, an assignee may recover from the debtor the
full amount of the assigned claim, regardless of the price he actually
paid for the assignment. On the other hand, according to traditional
doctrine that explained subrogation principles, and the jurisprudence that
has applied traditional law, a subrogee may recover only the amount
that he actually paid to the obligee.8 '
Because of those differences, it was possible under traditional law
for an obligee to gain an advantage by alleging his rights had been
acquired by subrogation rather than by assignment in order to circum-
vent, for example, the requirement that he give notice of the assignment
to the obligor.
Similarities
Besides those differences, the rights acquired by an assignee and a
subrogee are essentially the same. In addition to the principal right to
demand performance by an obligor, both acquire accessory rights that
include not only suretyship, as recognized by traditional law, but also
78. See La. Ci,. Code arts. 2646-2647. See also 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra
note 3, at 653-57.
79. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 655. Also, for purposes of
analogy, Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
80. See La. Civ. Code art. 2643 and La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (c); Audubon
Insurance Co. v. Farr, 453 So. 2d 232 (La. 1984).
81. See Shropshire v. His Creditors, 15 La. Ann. 705 (1860); Roman v. Forstall, 11
La. Ann. 717 (1856); H.B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 306 So. 2d 785 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975).
1158 [Vol. 50
SUBROGA TION
the right of preference arising from mortgage, pledge or privilege.8 2 In
the case of assignment of a credit-right, the wide range of accessory
rights acquired by the assignee is clearly stated in an article of the
Louisiana Civil Code. 3 In the case of subrogation, the Louisiana Civil
Code states that a person who subrogates himself to the right of an
obligee may avail himself of that obligee's action and security, though
traditional law contains no similar provision. 4 The Louisiana jurispru-
dence has asserted without hesitation that conventional or legal subro-
gation effects a transfer of the rights, privileges and mortgages of the
obligee.8 5
Consequences of Identity of Regime
The main consequence of subjecting subrogation by the obligee to
the rules that govern assignment of rights is that, regardless of the
amount he actually paid to the obligee, the third person, or subrogee,
may recover from the obligor the full amount originally owed by the
obligor to the obligee. s6 As shown before, traditional law provided a
different solution, which only allowed the third person to recover the
amount he actually paid to the obligee.17 The reason for the rule stemmed
from provisions of the civil codes that contemplate assignment of rights
as an onerous transaction from which the third person intends to derive
a profit by purchasing the obligee's credit, no doubt for less than its
face value. Subrogation by the obligee, on the other hand, has tradi-
tionally been regarded as resulting from an act of kindness on the part
of the third person, or subrogee, who gratuitously or benevolently, helps
the debtor by paying his debt, but not for the purpose of speculating
or making a profit.
Although such a distinction is theoretically sound, it is hard to make
in the vast majority of practical situations. When a person pays the
debt of another and obtains subrogation from the obligee, the onerous
or gratuitous nature of the act depends on that person's intention, which
is seldom disclosed. Louisiana courts were forced to make artificial
distinctions under traditional law because of the difficulties of ascer-
taining whether performance rendered by a person other than the obligor
82. See C. civ. art. 1252; La. Civ. Code art. 2162 (1870); La. Civ. Code art. 1826
and comment (d) thereto.
83. See La. Civ. Code art. 2645.
84. See La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
85. See Ferrari v. Durac and Sheriff, 25 La. Ann. 80 (1873); King v. Dwight, 3
Rob. 2 (La. 1842).
86. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (d).
87. See 1158 supra.
88. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 653-55.
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was a purchase of the obligee's credit-right or was prompted by a
generous intent to help the obligor s9
The identity of regime for both subrogation by the obligee and
assignment of rights eliminates that difficulty. Under the single regime
the third person may recover the full amount owed by the obligor,
regardless of the amount paid to the obligee at the time the subrogation
was effected. If that person, or subrogee, rendered performance to the
obligee out of a spirit of generosity towards the obligor, he is perfectly
free to limit his recovery from the obligor to the amount actually paid.
Another consequence of the identity of regime is that conventional
subrogation by the obligee is effective against third persons, including
the obligor, only when notice is given to the latter, though it is valid
between the parties without more. 9°
An important exception to the rule that provides for an identity of
regime takes place when the obligee paid only in part, since, in that
case, the subrogee's right yields in rank to the original obligee's right
to the balance owed when the obligor's assets are insufficient to satisfy
both. 9'
CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION BY THE OBLIGOR
Obligor and Third Person
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that an obligor who pays a debt
with money or other fungible things borrowed for that purpose may
subrogate the lender to the rights of the obligee, even without the
obligee's consent. 92
Allowing an obligor such discretion is strange, to say the least.
Under that provision, the obligor can dispose of a credit-right that is
actually in the obligee's patrimony and transfer it to another, namely
the lender. An eminent French authority calls such an act abnormal
because no reasonable theoretical explanation can be found for it and
asserts that it can be understood only in light of the practical needs
such discretion is designed to satisfy. 93 Indeed, that rule allows an obligor
to free himself from the debt he owes to the obligee using resources
he might have obtained at lower interest or for a longer term than the
one agreed to with the original obligee. A lender may be amenable to
89. See Dixie Land Co. v. Blythe, 227 La. 889, 80 So. 2d 853 (1955); Gernon v.
McCan, 23 La.Ann. 84 (1871).
90. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (c). See also 1158 supra.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 1828.
93. 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 630. See also A. Weill et F. Terr6,
supra note 3, at 1076-77.
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giving such advantage in return for the benefit of subrogation offered
by the obligor, without having to fear any opposition from the obligee.
In that context, the resources that the obligor obtains from a lender
may consist of fungible things other than money. Although in the vast
majority of instances the obligor will borrow money, a merchant might
obtain a loan of a certain quantity of goods from another in the same
trade, which the borrower intends to use as the object of a performance
he owes to an obligee. 94 The Louisiana Civil Code is not the only one
that contemplates such a situation and provides a rule the scope of
which is not limited to money. 9
As effected by the obligor, the subrogation just described causes no
harm to the lender whom the obligor subrogates to the rights of the
obligee, nor to the obligee himself. The lender suffers no harm since,
out of his free will, he enters with the obligor into a contract of loan,
either because of the advantage he expects to derive or more rarely,
because he wants to help the obligor. Nor does the obligee suffer any
injury because his expectation of receiving the performance owed to him
materializes through the subrogation. Nevertheless, the peculiar situation
of an obligee confronted with subrogation effected by his obligor deserves
further comment.
No Need for the Obligee's Consent
The obligor may subrogate the person who lends him the means to
pay the obligee without the obligee's consent. 96 Properly understood,
that rule means not only that the consent of the obligee is not needed
for validation but also that subrogation may be effected by the obligor
even against the will of the obligee. 97 The origin of the rule can be
found in a reaction against unfair practices that ancient French feudal
law allowed to creditors who could then refuse payment tendered by a
debtor who had borrowed money from a lender whom the debtor
intended to subrogate to the rights of the creditor. 98 A creditor could
thus prevent an alleviation of the burden of the debtor who had a
chance to obtain resources on terms less onerous than those to which
he had originally agreed with the creditor. In a manner consistent with
the principle that favors the liberation of obligors, a rule was fashioned
that deprives creditors of the power to oppose such payment and sub-
rogation by the obligor.
94. See La. Civ. Code art. 1828 comment (b).
95. See Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1202 (Ital.).
96. La. Civ. Code art. 1828.
97. See E. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana 439 (1925); Hood, Jr,
Subrogation, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 174, 182 (J. Dainow ed. 1969).
98. For the origin of the rule in an edict by Henry IV, King of France, in 1609,
see A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note 3, at 1077.
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When the practices that motivated the enactment of that rule are
contrasted with modern ones, it is easy to understand that advantageous
opportunities for subrogation effected by the obligor in favor of a lender
seldom present themselves in the world of contemporary transactions,
which diminishes the usefulness of that manner of subrogation and
tempers the rigor of the rule permitting subrogation without the obligee's
consent.
For example, loans of money at interest but for no fixed term might
have been a frequent practice in earlier times. In that case, if the creditor
were allowed to oppose subrogation by the debtor in favor of another
person who was willing to lend the debtor the same amount of money
at a lower interest, a good chance to alleviate his burden would be lost
for the debtor, which justified the rule depriving creditors of such power.
Now, however, a loan at interest without a fixed or determinable term
would be a rare occurrence. When there is a term during which interest
accrues for the creditor, the term is for the benefit of the obligee, who
cannot be forced to take performance rendered before arrival of the
term, either by the obligor or by a third person.9 On the other hand,
upon arrival of the term the creditor probably would be more than
happy to receive performance even if the debtor paid with money bor-
rowed from another, in which case the creditor would lack interest in
opposing a subrogation to his rights effected by the debtor in favor of
the person from whom he borrowed the money used to pay the debt.
The creditor then suffers no harm from the deprivation of the power
to oppose subrogation.
In sum, although an obligor who borrows the resources needed to
perform an obligation may subrogate the lender to the rights of the
obligee even against the obligee's will, that subrogation presupposes the
obligor actually rendered performance to the obligee with those resources,
and that performance cannot be forced upon an obligee to the detriment
of his valid interest. Nevertheless, in the rare cases where that kind of
subrogation may be useful to an obligor, he may overcome resistance
by the obligee who refuses the performance the obligor wants to render
with means borrowed from a lender whom he intends to subrogate to
the obligee's rights by resorting to tender and deposit proceedings.' °°
Writing Required
In the context of subrogation effected by the obligor, the Louisiana
Civil Code provides that the subrogation agreement must be in writing
and express that the purpose of the loan is to pay the debt.' 0 Unlike
its French ancestor, and in a manner more consistent with contemporary
99. See La. Civ. Code art. 1779.
100. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1869-1872.
101. La. Civ. Code art. 1828.
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practices, the Civil Code of Louisiana does not require authentic form
for such an agreement. 0 2 Thus, a writing under private signature rather
than a notarial act suffices. 03 The writing need not contain the word
"subrogation," but the borrower's purpose of using the borrowed re-
sources to perform his obligation must be express. The name of the
obligee for whom the performance is intended and other circumstances
of the debt, such as the amount and place of payment, should be clearly
indicated in order to identify the obligation to be performed with the
borrowed resources.
The subrogation, however, is not effected by the writing itself, since
it cannot actually take place until the obligee receives performance. The
lender, therefore, should see to it that performance is actually rendered
to the obligee, which can be readily accomplished if the obligee is present
at the time the loan is made and the writing is executed. Otherwise,
for as long as the obligee is not paid, the agreement between the obligor
and the lender amounts to just a promise to subrogate made by the
former to the latter, a promise on which the lender may not feel very
inclined to rely. If the obligee is present when the agreement is made,
however, the difference between subrogation effected by the obligor and
subrogation effected by the obligee becomes blurred, which is another
indication of the limited usefulness of subrogation effected by the ob-
ligor.
For the reason just stated, the French Civil Code in a traditional
approach requires not only that the agreement between the obligor and
the lender be in authentic form, but also that a receipt be extended by
the obligee clearly stating that the obligor has rendered performance
with the borrowed resources.'01 In the opinion of French doctrine, if
an obligee refuses to extend such a receipt, he may be forced to do
so, since he cannot oppose subrogation effected by the obligor in the
manner here described. 05 Earlier Louisiana law prescribed the same
requirements. c 6 The Louisiana Civil Code has now departed from that
traditional approach in order to make the rules more consistent with
contemporary practices.
SUBROGATION BY OPERATION OF LAW
Underlying Policy
In the vast majority of instances, a person who performs the ob-
ligation of another does not need to obtain a conventional subrogation
102. See C. civ. art. 1250.
103. See La. Civ. Code art. 1837.
104. See C. civ. art. 1250.
105. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 632.
106. See La. Civ. Code art. 2160(2) (1870).
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by the obligee or the obligor because the law by its direct operation
subrogates that person to the right and action of the obligee. The
instances of legal subrogation, however, are exclusively enumerated in
the law since that kind of subrogation derogates from the well-established
principle that no one may acquire the right of another without the
concurrence of both the will of the person who acquires the right and
that of the one who transfers it.10 7
Sometimes, a person who performs for another is himself bound to
perform or does so for the protection of an important interest of his
own or of the obligor. The law provides for subrogation through its
own operation in order to encourage performance by a third person
when such are the circumstances. In so doing, it has been said, the law
introduces a sort of implied or constructive conventional subrogation. 1°0
The language of some Louisiana decisions suggests a liberal approach
to subrogation by operation of law. At one time a court stated that
the right to legal subrogation is to be recognized in every case where
a person pays a debt which he has an interest in discharging.' °9 At other
times, however, Louisiana courts concluded that, under well-known meth-
ods of statutory interpretation, the exceptions to the rule that payment
extinguishes the obligation and no subrogation takes place should be
strictly construed. 110 The latter approach is the correct one because of
the exceptional nature of subrogation by operation of law.
Obligee Who Pays Another Obligee
Subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor of an obligee
who pays another whose right is preferred to his because of a privilege,
pledge, mortgage, or security interest."'
Two requirements must be met for such legal subrogation to take
place. The first is that the person who pays the creditor of another
must be himself a creditor of the other. If he is not, the person who
pays can always obtain a conventional subrogation from the obligee or
from the obligor, but may not avail himself of legal subrogation. Thus,
Louisiana courts have denied legal subrogation to subcontractors who
paid wages of laborers who did not qualify as creditors of the owner
of the work at the time their wages were paid by the subcontractor
107. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 632-33.
108. Id.
109. R.F. Mestayer Lumber Co. v. Cusack, 141 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
See also Duchamp v. Dantilly, 9 La. Ann. 247 (1854).
110. Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969);
Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 244 La.
1005, 156 So. 2d 57 (1963).
111. La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
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because of the lack of timely recordation of their rights." 2 Likewise, a
finance company which paid the debt owed to a creditor holding a first
mortgage on certain property was held not to be legally subrogated to
the right of the first mortgagee because the company was not a creditor
of the mortgagor at the time it made payment to the mortgagee. 113
The second requirement is that the right of the creditor being paid
must be preferred to the right of the creditor who makes the payment.
The preference may be based on a privilege, pledge, mortgage, or security
interest held by the creditor being paid, while the creditor who pays
has no security or has one inferior in rank to the security of the creditor
to whom he pays the debt of the mutual obligor. The conclusion of
the Louisiana jurisprudence is that legal subrogation avails all creditors
that are "inferior," either because they are unsecured, or because, though
preferred, their security is of a lower rank than the one retained by
other creditors. Thus, a third mortgagee who pays a first mortgagee is
legally subrogated to the right of the latter."14 The same conclusion
prevails for the same reason when a creditor who holds a second
mortgage pays another who maintains a first mortgage on the same
property." 5 Likewise, legal subrogation avails an unsecured creditor who
pays another creditor who holds a mortgage on property of their mutual
debtor."16 It also avails a junior creditor who pays a seizing one. ' 7 By
the same token, a materialman or subcontractor who pays the wages
of laborers is subrogated by operation of law to the laborers' privilege
on the owner's property." 8
The corresponding article of the French Civil Code allows legal
subrogation only when the creditor who is paid is preferred to the one
making the payment because of a privilege or mortgage." 9 French doc-
trine bemoans the fact that French jurisprudence invoking that restricted
language as a justification has refused subrogation to creditors who paid
other creditors secured by other devices. 20 Such a restrictive approach
could not be justified in Louisiana where the pertinent article of the
Civil Code, after listing privilege, mortgage and pledge as sources of
112. Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969);
Succession of Andrews, 153 So. 2d 470 (1963).
113. Allied Mortgage and Dev. Co. v. Warner, 185 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966).
114. White System of Alexandria v. Fitzhugh, 5 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
115. Decuir v. Carnes, 173 La. 563, 138 So. 103 (1931).
116. Hall v. Hawley, 49 La. Ann. 1046, 22 So. 205 (1897).
117. Silbernagel v. Douglas, App., Gunby's Dec. (2d Cir. 1885) 62.
118. Tilly v. Bauman, 174 La. 71, 139 So. 762 (1932); A. Stef Lumber Co. v. Mattingly,
168 La. 645, 122 So. 893 (1929).
119. C. civ. art. 1251.
120. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 639.
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the requisite preference, also lists a "security interest" in general.' 21 For
instance, since a seller's right to dissolve the sale and recover the property
when the buyer fails to pay the price is a security interest, another
creditor of the buyer could pay the price and subrogate himself to the
seller's right to dissolve, provided the other creditor's right is unsecured
or his credit is protected only by a weaker security and that other rights
of the seller are not thereby impaired, a solution which finds support
in French doctrine. 122
When a creditor is preferred because of his right of mortgage on
certain property of the debtor, it has been held that legal subrogation
does not take place in favor of an inferior creditor who pays the
mortgagee if the mortgage is erased from the records.12 1 If understood
in an unrestricted manner, that conclusion would allow either a debtor
or a superior creditor to defeat the interest of the inferior creditor and
potential subrogee by simply causing the mortgage to be erased from
the records. As between inferior and superior creditors, or as between
an inferior creditor and the debtor, erasure of the mortgage should not
prevent subrogation for the same reasons that did not preclude it in a
situation where mortgage notes had been marked "cancelled" and re-
turned to the debtor.' 24 On the other hand, if a mortgage has been
erased from the records, legal subrogation should not take place in
favor of an inferior creditor who pays the mortgagee once a third person
has relied on the erasure or absence of recordation of an interest adverse
to his. 125
A question has been raised in modern French doctrine about the
reasons why subrogation that the law through its own operation allows
to an inferior creditor who pays a preferred one, is not allowed also
to a preferred creditor who pays another creditor of a lower rank.' 26
Indeed, situations can arise where a creditor whose security primes that
of another creditor has an interest in paying the latter and being sub-
rogated to the right of the lower-ranked creditor, as when a second
mortgagee wants to foreclose on the mortgaged property and the first
mortgagee wants to delay foreclosure because he expects market con-
ditions to improve and he might secure a better price by selling the
121. La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
122. In this context see Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975); La. Civ. Code
arts. 2561 and 2562; see 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 639.
123. See Pelican Homestead and Savings Association v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 532
So. 2d 397 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Allied Mortgage and Dev. Co. v. Warner, 185 So.
2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
124. White System of Alexandria v. Fitzhugh, 5 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942);
Walmsley v. Theus, 107 La. 417, 31 So. 869 (1901).
125. See La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
126. See A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note 3, at 1082.
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property later. When such is the case, the first mortgagee might want
to pay the second in rank if he were protected by legal subrogation.
The language of the law clearly states, however that such subrogation
only benefits an inferior creditor, not the preferred one. A preferred
creditor in such a situation, on the other hand, can always negotiate
for a conventional subrogation from the second mortgagee or the debtor. 27
The question arose whether the legal subrogation here discussed
avails a creditor who pays a preferred one when the paying creditor
also is an obligor of the one to whom he has paid. The Louisiana
jurisprudence has given a negative answer on the grounds that the person
making payment should be a third person vis-a-vis the obligee of the
debt he is seeking to prime through that payment.1 2 For example, a
contractor and his laborers are both obligees of the owner of the
construction-the contractor by virtue of the contract in which the owner
agrees to pay for the job and the laborers by virtue of the privilege
that the law allows them on the land and improvements on which their
work or labor was performed.1 29 Because of that privilege the laborers'
rank primes the contractor's as obligees of the owner. When the con-
tractor pays the laborers their wages, he might be regarded as an obligee
who pays other obligees whose rights are preferred to his because of a
privilege and might therefore be deemed entitled to subrogate himself
to the secured rights of the superior obligees. On the other hand, he
is also the primary obligor of the obligation to pay wages to the laborers
since he is the one who hired them. For the laborers this means the
contractor is not a third person who voluntarily pays them, but is one
who is bound to them by a legal relationship and who simply discharges
his own obligation by making payment. That kind of separate relation-
ship between the inferior creditor and the preferred one prompted Louis-
iana courts to conclude that legal subrogation does not take place in
favor of the inferior creditor in such situations. 30 That conclusion is
questionable, however, as it is predicated on the premise that for this
type of subrogation to take place payment must be made to a preferred
creditor by another creditor for the benefit of the debtor.3' Such a
peculiar requirement can be found neither in the theoretical foundation
of this type of subrogation nor in the way that it has been discussed
in the classical and modern doctrine. On the contrary, since its origins
in Roman law, and also through its reception in the Siete Partidas, the
subrogation discussed here is based on the assumption that payment is
127. See 1152 supra.
128. See New Orleans Nat'l Bank v. Eagle Cotton Warehouse & Compress Co., 43
La. Ann. 814, 9 So. 442 (1891).
129. See La. Civ. Code art. 3249(2). Cf. La. R.S. 9:4802, 4820 (1989).
130. See Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 226 So. 2d 502 (La. 1969).
131. Id. at 515.
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made to the preferred creditor for the benefit of the inferior one who
makes the payment.' 32 Nor does it seem practically necessary for the
paying creditor to be a stranger to the relationship between the preferred
creditor and the debtor. Moreover, the most important decision in which
that conclusion was reached can perhaps be justified on different grounds,
such as doubts concerning the preferred creditor status of the laborers
paid by the contractor and the fact that the contractor did not qualify
to benefit from legal subrogation under any other provision.' Never-
theless, that conclusion lies at the root of the marked divergence of
subsequent decisions concerning the legal subrogation of subcontractors
to the preferred position of the laborers whose wages they have paid
as obligees of the owner of the work in which they labored.'3 4 More
recently, in a decision not involving laborers and contractors, the Louis-
iana jurisprudence seems to depart from the assumption that a third
person who pays must be a stranger to the relationship between the
preferred creditor and the debtor for subrogation to take place in favor
of the person who pays.'
Purchaser of Property Who Uses Price to Pay Creditors
Subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor of a purchaser
of a movable or immovable property who uses the purchase money to
pay creditors holding any privilege, pledge, mortgage, or security interest
on the property.3 6
Thus, a buyer of property subject to a mortgage who uses the money
to pay the mortgagee rather than paying the price to the vendor becomes
substituted to the right of the mortgagee through the subrogation by
law and will be protected against the vendor's action for the price. A
distinguished French authority even asserts that such a buyer actually
liberates himself from the duty he owes the vendor for the purchase
132. See P. Girard, Manuel tlmentaire de Droit Romain 784-786 (5th ed. 1911); Las
siete partidas 5. 13. 34. See also 1 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 12, at 187, 203,
where an assertion was made that the court seems to have interpreted as favoring such
a requirement though that is not what the French writers say; id.
133. See Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 226 So. 2d 502 (La. 1969). See
also 1170 infra.
134. See Ragsdale v. Hoover, 353 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Hunt v. La
Chere Maison, Inc., 316 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1975).
135. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990),
where it was held that an excess insurance policy carrier who pays to a tort victim an
amount over and above the policy limits of the primary insurer need not be a third party
disinterested in the obligation in order for it to be conventionally and legally subrogated
to the rights of the insured against the primary insurer, when the latter, because of its
bad faith, has caused its insured to suffer damages in excess of the coverage provided
by the primary insurance policy.
136. La. Civ. Code art. 1829(2).
1168 [Vol. 50
SUBROGATION
price by extinguishing an obligation of the vendor.' If the amount of
the debt secured by the mortgage is less than the amount of the price,
the buyer clearly owes the difference to the vendor. On the other hand,
if the amount of the debt secured by the mortgage exceeds the price
of the property, the buyer's credit against the vendor for the difference
will be unsecured, unless the mortgage held by the creditor and paid
by the buyer also covered other property of the vendor.
Such a buyer is likewise protected if the property is subject to more
than one mortgage and is auctioned as a result of an action brought
by a mortgagee of a rank inferior to that of the creditor paid by the
buyer. In such a case, the buyer, though he loses the property, stands
a good chance to recover the purchase money he used to pay the superior
creditor because of the superior rank of that creditor to whose right
he subrogated himself.'
Departing from traditional law, the Louisiana Civil Code allows the
benefit of such legal subrogation not only to the buyer of immovable,
but also to the buyer of movable property, and not only for the payment
of mortgage creditors with the purchase money, but also for the payment
of creditors holding other kinds of security interests such as a pledge
or a privilege.' Thus, legal subrogation should operate in favor of a
buyer who uses the purchase money to pay laborers or materialmen
who have properly recorded their privileges.' 4°
Such a buyer benefits from legal subrogation even when he has
borrowed the purchase money he uses to pay a creditor holding a security
interest on the purchased property. '4' And that subrogation takes place
whether payment is made by the buyer himself or by his mandatary.142
It is noteworthy that the legal subrogation here discussed operates
not only with respect to the property, the price of which is used by
the buyer to pay a creditor who holds a security interest thereon, but
also with respect to other property of the vendor subject to the interest
of the creditor paid by the buyer. 43 For example, a Louisiana court
asserted in one case that a buyer who paid a debt secured by a mortgage
on both the property he bought and additional acreage became sub-
rogated by operation of law to the mortgage on the entire tract.'"
137. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 635.
138. Id.
139. La. Civ. Code art. 1829 comment (b). See also White System of Alexandria v.
Fitzhugh, 5 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
140. See La. R.S. 9:4831 (1983).
141. See Bierhorst v. Fruthaler, 231 La. 176, 91 So. 2d 1 (1956).
142. Id.
143. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 636-37.
144. Nelson v. Stewart, 173 La. 203, 136 So. 565 (1931).
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A buyer who makes such a disposition of the purchase price benefits
from legal subrogation. even when he buys at a judicial sale. 45 When
that is the case, however, it must be clear that payment to the creditor
is made by the buyer himself or his mandatary. Thus, a Louisiana
decision held that a buyer at a .judicial sale did not benefit from legal
subrogation because his payment to the creditor secured by a mortgage
on the property sold had been made by the sheriff acting as agent of
the vendor.146
If a mortgage to which a buyer is subrogated is cancelled by error,
it may be reinscribed through proceedings held contradictorily between
the buyer and the recorder of mortgages.147
The legal subrogation here discussed does not operate in favor of
the acquirer of property by gratuitous act, such as a donee. 41
Obligor Bound with Others or for Others
Subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor of an obligor
who pays a debt with others or for others and who has recourse against
those others as a result of the payment. 149 That rule contemplates an
instance of legal subrogation that occurs in a wide variety of situations,
unlike the rules governing the other instances heretofore discussed, which
are considerably more limited.
A distinction is made between obligors bound with others and ob-
ligors bound for others. The former are principal obligors, as in the
case of persons solidarily, bound, while the latter are subsidiary obligors,
at least insofar as the relationship among them is concerned, as in the
case of sureties. 50 The distinction is sufficiently important as to merit
the separate treatment of each category. Here, it suffices to say that
an obligee bound with others is entitled to recover from those' others
the amount he paid to the obligee, but with deduction of his own
portion of the debt. An obligor bound for others, however, is entitled
to recover from those others as much as he paid to the obligee, which
in certain instances includes interest and attorney's fees.'5 '
Nevertheless, for legal subrogation to operate the obligor must have
a recourse against the other obligors with whom or for whom he is
bound. That requirement of the Louisiana Civil Code is clearer than
145. Barilleaux v. Toft, 5 La. App. 756 (1st Cir. 1927).
146. Id.
147. See Nelson v. Stewart, 173 La. 203, 136 So. 565 (1931). But see Pelican Homestead
and Sav. Ass'n v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 532 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
148. Cf. I C. Aubry et C. Rau, supia note 12, at 201.
149. La. Civ. Code art. 1829(3).
150. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 633.
151. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1804, 3048, 3052.
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the one found in traditional law, according to which an obligor benefits
from legal subrogation if he pays a debt he had an interest in discharging.
Perhaps that is so because he would sustain a loss if the debt is not
paid, since it can be said that only a volunteer or an intermeddler would
pay a debt he has no interest in discharging.'
In sum, the legal subrogation here discussed benefits one who is
already an obligor, though not the only one, at the time he renders
performance to the obligee and who is bound in such a way that the
law gives him recourse against other obligors once he has rendered that
performance.
Obligor Bound with Others
Clearly, an obligor is bound with others when the obligation is
solidary.' m An obligee is also bound with others when the obligation is
indivisible.'5 4 Furthermore, each of multiple sureties for the same debt
is bound with others, at least in his relation to the other sureties, since
if he pays the whole debt he renders not only his share of the per-
formance owed to the obligee, but also the shares of the others.'
According to the Louisiana jurisprudence, a co-owner of immovable
property who pays the whole cost of pavements required by a city is
subrogated by operation of law to the rights of the creditor who did
the pavement job against the other co-owners. 5 6 Likewise, legal sub-
rogation to the rights of the creditor operates in favor of a co-obligor
of taxes who has paid the whole debt, for shares of the debt that would
have been due from the other co-obligors. 7 It also benefits a mandatary
who pays a promissory note on which he bound himself together with
his principal." 8 Likewise, a divorced wife solidarily bound with her
former husband is legally subrogated to the right against her former
husband of the mortgagee to whom she paid a debt." 9 By the same
token, the endorser of a promissory note who pays a judgment rendered
152. See C. civ. art. 1251; La. Civ. Code art. 2161(3) (1870). See also Hutchinson v.
Rice, 105 La. 474. 29 So. 898 (1901); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co.,
143 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also American Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law of Restitution § 162, at 653 (1937); McClintock, Handbook of the Principles
of Equity 332 (2d ed. 1948) and Note, Subrogation and the Volunteer Rule, 24 Va. L.
Rev. 771 (1938) for a discussion of the problems at common law the approach of which
seems to permeate some early Louisiana decisions.
153. See La. Civ. Code art. 1794.
154. See La. Civ. Code art. 1818.
155. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3055, 3056.
156. Succession of Whitehead, 3 La. Ann. 396 (1848).
157. Carpenter v. Cox, 186 So. 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
158. Hart v. Polizzotto, 168 La. 356, 122 So. 64 (1929).
159. Hilgenfeld v. Hilgenfeld, 180 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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against himself and the maker subrogatts himself to the rights of the
judgment-creditor against the maker. 160
The legal subrogation here discussed takes place regardless of whether
the obligation is contractual or delictual in origin and regardless of
whether the obligation derives from the same or different sources for
each of the obligors bound with others or for others.' 6' Thus, once it
is adjudged that two persons who through their fault have caused damage
to another are solidarily liable to the victim, the one who pays the
whole benefits from legal subrogation for the contribution he is entitled
to recover from the other. 62
A question arose whether an insurer who indemnifies the victim of
a quasi-delict enjoys legal subrogation to the rights of the victim against
the wrongdoer. As a matter of practice, many insurance policies provide
for the conventional subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the
insured upon payment of indemnification for a risk. Even when a policy
does not contain such a provision, an insurance carrier will obtain such
a conventional subrogation at the time of making payment and securing
the customary release in most instances. The question then, is whether
an insurer is subrogated by operation of law to the rights of the insured
or victim in the absence of any conventional subrogation. For a long
time the Louisiana jurisprudence gave a negative answer. 61 More re-
cently, however, Louisiana courts have answered the question affirma-
tively, at least where property insurance is concerned.'" Thus, in a case
involving an insurance carrier that had paid the insured for damage
caused by fire, the court clearly asserted that the insurer was subrogated
by operation of law to the rights of the owner for the damaged property,
even though conventional subrogation had been outrightly denied to the
insurer by the owner at the time the payment for the loss was made. 65
The affirmative answer is no doubt the correct one, as both insurer and
wrongdoer are bound one with the other towards the victim, the obligee,
to whom a duty of reparation is owed for his loss, thereby meeting the
requirement that governs the instance of legal subrogation here discussed,
even though the insurer is bound by a contract while the wrongdoer is
bound by law. The same conclusion should prevail where an insurer of
civil liability for personal injury is involved, as the same requirement
160. Succession of Dorsey, 7 La. Ann. 34 (1852).
161. See La. Civ. Code art. 1797.
162. See Spanja v. Thibodaux Boiler Works, 33 So. 2d 146 (La. App. Orl. 1948).
163. See D.R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, Jackson & Great N. R.R. Co., 26 La.
Ann. 447 (1874); Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228
(1957). See also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 132 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961).
164. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986).
165. Sentry Indem. Co. v. Rester, 430 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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is met concerning the legal bond that binds insurer and wrongdoer to
the victim1 6
The legal subrogation here discussed clearly does not benefit joint
or several obligors. 67
Obligor Bound for Others
The clearest example of an obligor bound for others is a surety,
who by definition is one who binds himself to perform the obligation
of another in case the latter fails to perform.' 68 The Louisiana Civil
Code clearly provides that the surety who pays the principal obligation
is subrogated by operation of law to the rights of the creditor. 69 Thus,
when a person pays the rent owed by a lessee because of an agreement
to do so, legal subrogation to the right and privilege of the lessor takes
place in favor of the person who paid. 70 When there are multiple sureties
for the same obligation of the same obligor, the one who pays the
creditor benefits from legal subrogation to the latter's right in order to
recover from the others the share of the principal obligation that each
is to bear. If he so wishes, however, the surety may proceed directly
against the principal obligor. 7'
Sureties are not the only example of obligors for others. A person
who grants a mortgage on his property to secure the debt of another
also is such an obligor, so that if he pays the secured debt he benefits
from legal subrogation to the right of the creditor against the principal
obligor.12 If the mortgage is a first one and other mortgages were later
granted on the same property, the mortgagor who pays the first mort-
gagee thereby subrogates himself to the right of the first, which would
prevent the other mortgages from advancing in rank, thereby protecting
his interest on his own property.
He who binds himself to pay the stipulated damages for which
another obligor may be held liable or who secures with his own property
payment of such damages by a principal obligor is also bound for
another. 73 Likewise, when the liability of an excess insurer is triggered
166. See W. McKenzie & H. Johnson, Insurance 636-643 (1986) and the supplement
thereto 85-89 (1989); Hood, supra note 97, at 191-92. Cf. Niemann v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979), where legal subrogation is denied to an insured motorist
carrier on grounds of La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (1989). See also La. R.S. 23:1162 (1962),
allowing legal subrogation to a workmen's compensation insurance carrier.
167. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1787, 1788.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 3035.
169. La. Civ. Code art. 3048.
170. Stiewell v. Burdell, 18 La. Ann. 17 (1866).
171. La. Civ. Code art. 3056.
172. La. Civ. Code art. 3295.
173. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2005-2011.
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by the bad faith failure to perform of the primary insurer, the latter
is considered the principal obligor and the former may be subrogated
to the right of the insured for the full amount of the excess paid.7 4
Heir Who Pays Debts of the Succession
Subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor of an heir
with benefit of inventory who pays debts of the estate with his own
funds. '
The benefit of inventory is the privilege which the heir obtains of
being liable for the charges and debts of the succession only to the
extent of the value of the effects of the succession, by causing an
inventory of those effects to be made in the manner prescribed by law.'7 6
All successors by universal title, which excludes particular legatees, also
may avail themselves of that privilege. 77
For this kind of legal subrogation to take place, the debt paid by
the successor must be one of the estate, but it is often immaterial
whether or not the debt was incurred by the deceased. Thus, legal
subrogation benefits a successor who pays legal and funeral expenses
chargeable to the estate.'78 The successor who pays such a debt, however,
must do so with his own funds in order to subrogate himself to the
right of the creditor.
Some Louisiana decisions have liberally interpreted the rule and
allowed legal subrogation to take place in favor of persons connected
to a succession, such as close relatives or administrators who are not
themselves successors, on the grounds that such persons should be en-
couraged not to delay payment of debts of the estate by the assurance
that they will enjoy a privilege for the amounts they expend.,7 9 As
persuasive as the rationale may be, the fact is that such a liberal
interpretation exceeds the scope of the rule.
Once subrogated to the rights of the creditor, the successor who
paid the debt of the estate enjoys the security and privilege of the
creditor for the contribution the successor may recover from other
successors in proportion to the share each has in the succession.11°
It is noteworthy that special statute provides that every successor is
presumed and deemed to have accepted a succession under benefit of
174. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990).
175. La. Civ. Code art. 1829(4).
176. La. Civ. Code art. 1032.
177. See La. Civ. Code arts. 876, 1424, 1430.
178. See Legendre v. Rodrigue, 358 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied,
359 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1978).
179. See Succession of Holstun, 141 So. 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
180. La. Civ. Code art. 1427.
1174 [Vol. 50
SUBROGATION
inventory even though the acceptance is unconditional, where an inven-
tory or descriptive list has been executed, in which case every heir or
legatee, whether particular or under a universal title, is not in any
manner personally liable for any debt or obligation of the decedent or
his estate, except to the amount of his inheritance, although any such
heir or legatee may obligate himself personally for such debts if he so
wishes.' 1
Other Cases Provided by Law
Subrogation by operation of law takes place in other cases provided
in legislation other than the civil code." 2
For example, a state-supported charity hospital is legally subrogated
to the rights of a patient against an alleged tortfeasor to the extent of
reasonable charges for services rendered to the patient." 3 It has been
decided that such subrogation of the charity hospital against the wrong-
doer does not imply that the injured patient himself is unable to seek
recovery from the one who caused his injuries.8 4
An employer who pays the claim of an injured employee is sub-
rogated to the right of that employee against whoever is liable for
reparation for the injuries that gave rise to the employee's claim.s' The
amount recoverable is limited to any amount the employer paid or
became liable to pay as compensation to the injured employee or his
dependents, which excludes any excess of the amount for which the
employer is legally liable. An employer who pays medical expenses for
the employee in excess of that which the law prescribes may obtain
conventional subrogation from the employee, however, thereby securing
the right to seek recovery of the full amount from the third person
ultimately liable.
8 6
An employer's insurer who pays the claim of its insured's employee
is subrogated to all rights and actions that the insured employer has
against a third. person.'17 Though that solution is provided by special
statute, it clearly would prevail even in the absence of a statute since
insurer and employer are bound the one with the other, which, as
discussed above, gives rise to subrogation by operation of law in favor
of the insurer who pays the employee.' 8
181. 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § 1, La. R.S. 9:1421 (Supp. 1990) (effective 1986).
182. La. Civ. Code art. 1829(5).
183. La. R.S. 46:8 (1982) (effective July 17, 1978).
184. See Ledbetter v. Hammond Milk Corp., 126 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
185. La. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1990).
186. See Chase v. Dunbar, 185 So. 2d 563 (La. 1st Cir. 1966).
187. La. R.S. 23:1123 (Supp. 1990).
188. See 1172 supra.
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Any person, other than the one in whose name property has been
assessed, who pays taxes on that property is subrogated to all rights
and privileges of the taxing authority.8 9 That instance of legal subro-
gation has peculiar aspects of its own, as the tax collector must issue
to the paying person a certificate of subrogation and in certain circum-
stances the consent of the original tax debtor is required. 9
The above are only some examples of subrogation that takes place
by operation of special law.
Effects
The Louisiana Civil Code clearly provides that when subrogation
takes place by operation of law, the new obligee may recover from the
obligor only to the extent of the performance rendered to the obligee.' 9'
The same solution prevails in French law where it has been asserted by
doctrine and jurisprudence, since it is not expressed in the Code Na-
poleon. 192
Thus, although subrogation effects a transfer of the active side of
the obligation from an original obligee to a new one, the natural effects
of subrogation are subject to a twofold limitation when the subrogation
is legal.
In the first place, the subrogee's recovery is limited to the amount
of the performance he actually rendered. That result is quite clear when
the subrogee has made only partial payment, since the original obligee
preserves his right to the balance and the obligor's burden may not be
increased by the subrogation of another person to the right of the
obligee.' 93 The subrogee's recovery is likewise limited even when he
completely extinguishes the obligation for the obligee through the pay-
ment of an amount less than the one actually owed, as when he obtains
a remission of the balance from the obligee or makes with him a
transaction or compromise. That is so, because when subrogation takes
place by operation of law, the parties' consent is less relevant, if at all,
and the new obligee should not be placed in a better position than the
original one for whom the obligation has been extinguished. In an early
Louisiana decision, that limitation was regarded as similar to the re-
striction imposed upon the right to recover of a negotiorum gestor and
is also rooted in principles of equity.' 9 That kind of theoretical spec-
189. La. R.S. 47:2105 (1990).
190. Id. See also Atkins v. Simpson, 28 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
191. La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
192. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 646.
193. See La. Civ. Code art. 1826. See also 1148 supra.
194. Roman v. Forstall, 11 La. Ann. 717 (1856). See also H.B. "Buster" Hughes,
Inc. v. Bernard, 306 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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ulation, perhaps unavoidably prompted by the inherently ambiguous
nature of subrogation, can now be spared in light of the clear provision
of the Louisiana Civil Code.
In a manner consistent with the general rule, a special one belonging
to the law of suretyship provides that a surety may not recover from
the principal obligor more than he paid to secure a discharge. 95 The
same solution prevails when one solidary obligor who pays the obligee
less than the amount owed to him obtains a full release of all solidary
obligors. 196
Because of that limitation, it is relevant that the effect of legal
subrogation differs importantly from the effect of conventional subro-
gation by the obligee, which, as shown earlier, amounts to an assignment
of the obligee's right that entitles the subrogee to recover the full extent
of the obligation from the obligor regardless of what the subrogee paid
to the obligee. 97
Similarly, when subrogation takes place by operation of law in favor
of one bound with others, as is the case with solidary obligors, the one
who pays the obligee does not receive from the latter the right to
demand the whole from any of the other solidary obligors, but must
divide the obligation among them and may seek to recover only the
share of each. 98 That traditional solution is founded on the reasonable
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits. 199
The Louisiana Civil Code further provides that the new obligee
under a legal subrogation may not recover more by invoking conventional
subrogation.2°° Thus, a person who subrogates himself to the right of
another by operation of law may not claim a greater advantage by
availing himself of conventional subrogation. If that were not so, the
limitation the law imposes upon the recovery of one legally subrogated
to the right of another could be easily circumvented to the detriment
of fairness.20 ' For example, a solidary obligor or surety who pays the
obligee less than the full amount of the obligation and together with a
full release obtains an assignment of the obligee's right, may not attempt
to recover more than he actually paid the obligee from another solidary
principal obligor by invoking the assignment. 20 2 That is so because parties
are not free to do what the law does not want them to do.
195. La. Civ. Code art. 3052.
196. See La. Civ. Code art. 1803.
197. See La. Civ. Code art. 1827. See also 1157 supra.
198. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1804, 3056.
199. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 647.
200. La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
201. See La. Civ. Code art. 1830 comment (c).
202. See Koeniger v. Lentz, 462 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). See also
Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979); Steele v.
Hough, 174 La. 441, 141 So. 22 (1932); Fox v. Corry, 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410 (1921).
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A question may arise when an obligee receives successive partial
payments from different persons, all of -whom are entitled to legal
subrogation. When that is the case the one who makes the second
payment, for example, could be regarded as subrogated to the obligee's
right to be paid with preference to the one who made the first partial
payment. The obligee's right of preference over a partial subrogee,
however, is regarded as personal and therefore not transferable by
subrogation to another partial subrogee. As a consequence all partial
subrogees share the same rank as creditors of the obligor.
20 3
Legal subrogation does not prevent the subrogee from availing him-
self of his own action against the obligor rather than the obligee's, such
as the action belonging to the manager of the affairs of another, which
in certain circumstances may be to his advantage. 204
THE REVISION
Place in the Civil Code
In the revision of the Louisiana law of obligations enacted in 1984,
the regulation of subrogation is contained in a section of a chapter
devoted to the transfer of obligations rather than in a section on the
regulation of payment, as it was in earlier Louisiana law, which followed
a traditional approach. 20 5 Indeed, in traditional law subrogation is re-
garded as an incident of the payment or performance of an obligation
by a person other than the obligor, or by one of multiple obligors
bound each with the others or for the others, which gave rise to the
traditional expression, "payment with subrogation." The fact is, how-
ever, that subrogation is a way of effecting a transfer of obligations,
which is the approach followed in modern law and doctrine. 206 When
subrogation is regarded as an incident of payment, the emphasis is
placed on the extinction of the obligation with respect to the original
obligee, which makes the survival of the obligation difficult to explain,
in spite of a change of obligee, unless refuge is sought in the readily
acceptable, but actually unsatisfactory, explanation of a legal fiction.
2 0 7
On the other hand, when subrogation is regarded as a manner of effecting
the transfer of a legal relation, it is the survival of the obligation that
203. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 649-50.
204. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2295, 2299. See also 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra
note 3, at 651-52.
205. See La. Civ. Code (1870) Book III, Title III, Chapter 4, Section 2. Cf. La. Civ.
Code (1870) Book III, Title IV, Chapter 5, Section 1, § 2.
206. See Ethiopian Civ. Code arts. 1968-1974 (1960); A. Weill et F. Terr6, supra note
3, at 1074-83.
207. See La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (a).
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is emphasized, and its extinction for the original obligee appears as a
natural consequence of a substitution of persons at the active end of
the obligation. Finally, it is simply not true that subrogation takes place
only on occasion of the payment or performance of an obligation, as
it is quite clear that it also results from a contract of sale where the
buyer subrogates himself to the seller's rights and actions in warranty
against other persons. 28
That change of place within the framework of the systematic ar-
rangement of the articles on obligations in the civil code should con-
tribute to a better understanding of the true nature of subrogation.
Definition and Statement of General Effect
A new article defines subrogation as the substitution of one person
to the rights of another. 209 A different new article provides a statement
of the general effect of subrogation by explaining that when subrogation
results from a person's performance of the obligation of another, that
obligation subsists in favor of the person who performed it, who may
avail himself of the action and security of the original obligee against
the obligor, but it is extinguished for the original obligee. 21 0
Without introducing any change in the law, the definition and state-
ment of general effect merely give express legislative formulation to
theoretical foundations of subrogation that are traditional in the civil
law.; That express formulation should help dispel misconception re-
garding the nature and practical consequences of subrogation. 21 2
Beyond Privileges and Mortgages
An earlier article of the Louisiana Civil Code stated that a third
person rendering performance to an obligee subrogated himself to the
latter's rights, actions, privileges and mortgages. 21 3 The new article states
that the third person may avail himself of the action and "security"
of the original obligee. 2 4 That is not a change in the law, but merely
a change in formulation made for the purpose of eliminating the risk
of mistaking the listing in the earlier article for an exclusive one. Indeed,
208. See La. Civ. Code art. 2503. Also La. Civ. Code art. 1826 comment (c).
209. La. Civ. Code art. 1825.
210. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
211. See 1 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 12, at 187-88. See also La. Civ. Code
art. 1826 comment (a).
212. See Motors Ins. Corp. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 52 So. 2d 311 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1951).
213. La. Civ. Code art. 2160(1) (1870).
214. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
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a subrogee may avail himself of security devices of the original obligee
other than privileges and mortgages. 21
5
Subrogation by the Obligee, Change in the Law
One new article introduces a significant change in the law by pro-
viding that conventional subrogation by the obligee is subject to the
rules governing the assignment of rights. 216 Under that article, the con-
ventional subrogee is substituted to all the rights of the original obligee
and is entitled to recover the full amount of the debt from the obligor,
regardless of the amount actually paid by the subrogee to the original
obligee. 217 Thus, prior jurisprudential conclusions that limited the sub-
rogee's recovery to the amount he actually paid in the case of conven-
tional subrogation by the obligee have been overruled. 218 That change
eliminates the task, almost impossible in certain factual situations, of
ascertaining whether the transferring of a sum of money between persons
is an act of payment by one of a debt a third owes to the other or
an act of purchase by one of a right the other has against a third
person, a task whose difficulty has been clearly shown in some Louisiana
decisions. 219 In so doing the change better meets the important need of
facilitating the unimpeded flow of business transactions.
An earlier article of the Louisiana Civil Code required that con-
ventional subrogation by the obligee be expressed and be made at the
same time as the payment. 220 The new article just discussed eliminates
those requirements, effecting another change in the law. 22 The agreement
for subrogation may now be made before the subrogee renders per-
formance and need not be in writing.222 Prior jurisprudential conclusions
to the contrary have been overruled. 221
Subrogation by the Obligor, Change in the Law
An earlier article of the Louisiana Civil Code provided that con-
ventional subrogation by an obligor in favor of a third person from
whom he borrowed the money to pay a debt had to be made by authentic
215. See 1159 supra.
216. La. Civ. Code art. 1827.
217. See 1159 supra. Also La. Civ. Code art. 1827 comment (d).
218. See Roman v. Forstall, II La. Ann. 717 (1856); H.B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v.
Bernard, 306 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
219. See Gerion v. McCan, 23 La. Ann. 84 (1871).
220. La. Civ. Code art. 2160(1) (1870).
221. La. Civ. Code art. 1827.
222. See 1155 supra.
223. See Legendre v. Rogrigue, 358 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied,
359 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1978).
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act reciting the loan and its purpose. It further required that the obligee
of that debt extend a receipt, also by authentic act, reciting that the
payment he received was made with money borrowed from a lender
who became the new creditor.2 2 4 The new article eliminates the require-
ment of an authentic act and also the need for a receipt extended in
the same form by the original obligee. 221 All that is now required is a
writing that may be executed under private signature. 226 That change
has no other purpose than making the regulation of conventional sub-
rogation by the obligor more consistent with contemporary business
practices .221
The same article contemplates that the means borrowed by an obligor
in order to perform his obligation may be fungible things other than
money. 22 That minor change also accounts for contemporary business
practices and expands the scope of conventional subrogation by the
obligor in a manner consistent with general principle. 229
Legal Subrogation, Change in the Law
An earlier article of the Louisiana Civil Code provided that, among
other situations, subrogation by operation of law takes place for the
benefit of the purchaser of any immovable property who employs the
price in paying creditors to whom the property was mortgaged. 2 ° The
new article extends that benefit to buyers of movable property since
there is no longer a reason to distinguish between movables and im-
movables as objects on which a real right of security can be granted.2 11
The same new article also extends that benefit to buyers who use the
purchase price to pay creditors who hold any privilege, pledge or security
interest on the property, as well as to buyers who pay a mortgage. 23 2
That change is a natural consequence of the inclusion of movables within
the scope of that rule.
Effects of Legal Subrogation, No Change in the Law
A new article provides that when subrogation takes place by op-
eration of law the new obligee may recover from the obligor only to
the extent of the performance rendered to the original obligee. 233 That
224. La. Civ. Code art. 2160(2) (1870).
225. La. Civ. Code art. 1828.
226. Id.
227. See La. Civ. Code art. 1828 comment (a).
228. La. Civ. Code art. 1828.
229. See La. Civ. Code art. 1828 comment (b).
230. La. Civ. Code art. 2161(2) (1870).
231. La. Civ. Code art 1829(2) and comment (b) thereto.
232. Id.
233. La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
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is an express legislative formulation of a rule that has always been
recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence. No change is effected by that
formulation. 23 4 It is clear, however, that the new article limits recovery
by the subrogee in that way only when subrogation takes place by
operation of law, since another article does not so limit recovery by
the subrogee from the obligor in the case of conventional subrogation
by the obligee. 21
The same new article provides that the new obligee may not recover
more by invoking conventional subrogation.23 6 No change in the law is
effected, since that conclusion can be readily derived from general prin-
ciple, as recognized by the jurisprudence. 237
Partial Subrogation, No Change in the Law
No change has been effected concerning the effect of a partial
subrogation. A new article clearly states that an original obligee who
has been paid only in part may exercise his right for the balance of
the debt in preference to the new obligee. 28 The earlier article also
stated that subrogation was effective not only against debtors, but also
against sureties. 23 9 Without attempting any change, that sentence of the
earlier article has been suppressed, since it merely restates one of the
general effects of subrogation.2 40
234. See 7 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 3, at 646.; H.B. "Buster" Hughes,
Inc. v. Bernard, 306 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
235. La. Civ. Code art. 1827. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
236. La. Civ. Code art. 1830.
237. See 1176 supra.
238. La. Civ. Code art. 1826 and comment (e) thereto.
239. La. Civ. Code art. 2160 (1870).
240. See La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
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